WITH the induction of the elected government, there has been a lot of discussion about Pakistan’s role in the ‘war against terror’. Understandably, there is growing concern over the bloody backlash ordinary Pakistanis are being subjected to from terrorists reacting to government attacks on their sanctuaries.
Several members of the coalition government, as well as the new provincial chief minister of the NWFP, have suggested they will negotiate with the militants to end violence in Pakistan. Given the plethora of Islamic groups currently waging jihad against their own people, it is not clear whom they will talk to, but even assuming they find interlocutors there is the larger problem of agreeing on a common agenda.
Normally, conflicts are about land and resources. Both can be negotiated. Civil wars over autonomy and independence have been successfully resolved. But ideological battles are usually fought until the bitter end. The motivation here is the conviction that one particular utopian vision is superior to all other systems, and thus confers upon its followers the right to impose it on the rest of the world, with brute force if necessary.
This frightening close-mindedness was best illustrated in an article by Pervez Hoodhboy appeared in a sction of press last last month. The writer described a recruitment film produced for Al Qaeda in which the leader says something to a member of a group of masked men in a foreign language, pointing towards a high rock nearby. Without a word, the man climbs up and then leaps off, shouting ‘Allah-o-Akbar!’ His companions gather around his dead, broken body and quickly bury it in a shallow grave. They then march over the grave, again shouting ‘Allah-o-Akbar!’
How do we negotiate with such people? Where is the common ground to build on? At best, they might agree to a temporary truce, as they have done in the past. But they use such respites to strengthen their position, while awaiting another opportunity to attack.
Even supposing they give credible guarantees to reassure the government that they will not attack targets within Pakistan if troops are withdrawn from the tribal areas, what is to stop them from attacking targets in Afghanistan? Many Pakistanis argue that what the Taliban do across the border is not our business, and we should let NATO and American forces take care of the Taliban threat.
The problem with this argument is that if we allow our territory to be used as a safe haven and a springboard for attacks on our neighbor, then under international law western forces can exercise the right of hot pursuit and attack targets on our soil. Then there are UN Security Council resolutions forbidding governments from helping the Taliban in any way.
But even more important is the stated aim of the Pakistani Taliban and their various offshoots. They have repeatedly said that after western forces have been expelled from Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s version of Islamic law imposed there, they will turn their attention to Pakistan
Al Qaeda and its many supporters are aiming to create a no-go space along the tribal belt from where they can operate without let or hindrance, as they did in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime before 9/11. To this end, they will do anything to destabilize Pakistan, and force its leaders to bend to their will. And if it takes thousands of innocent Pakistani lives to achieve their goal, they are totally indifferent to the human cost.
People who happily send their friends and comrades to their deaths on suicide missions are unlikely to care about strangers, even if they are fellow Muslims (For them Kafirs have no right to exist and for that matter no right at all but when they can not find a kafir to kill they become cannibals, may be due to urge of seeing human blood). Another thing people often forget is that the terrorist attacks in Pakistan did not begin with the post-9/11 western presence in Afghanistan. Outfits like the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi came into being during Zia’s lifetime, and have been creating havoc in Pakistan ever since. Governments have used such militias to further their agendas in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and now find the killers are out of control.
Clearly, then, if Pakistan is to survive this menace has to be eliminated. The problem is that many Pakistanis see the terrorists as fellow citizens with a legitimate cause. This is a view that unites the religious right with the radical left, such as it is. The fact is that the virulent anti-American sentiment that informs much of our political debate distorts our view of national self-interest. Far too many intelligent, educated Pakistanis feel that just because the Americans are against the Taliban and their supporters within Pakistan, we should take the opposite position.
And because we like our prejudices to be confirmed, far too many TV and newspaper commentators adopt this line. But although this viewpoint might be popular, it is intellectually and morally indefensible. We have all witnessed the havoc the Taliban visited upon Afghanistan when they were in power. Do we really wish this upon ourselves?
